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ABSTRACT 
The rapid expansion of space traffic enabled by the SmallSat revolution has enabled unparalleled opportunity for 
commercial, educational, and national interests.  However, it is an ongoing truth of space operations that the number 
of functioning spacecraft in orbit is vastly exceeded by non-functional orbital objects that can destroy them.   As 
with any other environment, orbital space is easily polluted by human activities, and at some point the pollution can 
significantly degrade the usefulness of that environment.  Today, there are more threats to more spacecraft than ever 
before, and the current accelerated growth of space activity consequently accelerates the growth of its risks. 
As early as 1988, US national space policy established the priority to protect the space environment.  Subsequently 
NASA and the US Department of Defense made first efforts on formal standard practices to control space debris as 
early as 1993.  Their work was expanded with the participation of all involved US agencies in the publication of the 
first US Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) document in 2001.  That document mandated 
minimum design and operations practices to best preserve the orbital environment with prudent, low-cost, 
mandatory steps.  Subsequently, global coordination through the Interagency Debris Coordination Committee 
(IADC) has propagated many of these practices to all space-faring powers with varying levels of success, and has 
elevated orbital debris mitigation to be a global concern.  Each US agency implements the standard practices within 
their own official regulatory/safety documents, such as NASA’s standard 8719.14 and DOD’s Directive 3100.10, 
and others. 
In the last decade innovative new practices, concepts, and massive constellation proposals have opened “future 
space” to realities not envisioned in the 2001 standard practices document.  Therefore, under Presidential Space 
Policy Directive #3 (June 8, 2018) all US space-related agencies were directed to coordinate a major revision to the 
ODMSP to reflect expected best practices for this new era in space.  This revised document was approved by the 
National Space Council in December 2019, and is reprinted here.  All US agencies with any certification or 
development authority over space launchers and/or spacecraft are now working to assure compliance of their 
internal standards with these practices.  In addition, a 2025 list of recommendations (non-mandatory) from the 18th 
Space Wing at the Central Space Operations Center introduces addition details of design and operations that are all 
useful in reducing the risks in small satellite operations.  This document is proposed for revision as well. 
No matter the intended function of a space object or launch vehicle, its certification for flight by any US agency will 
now depend upon meeting the minimum set of debris mitigation practices of the 2019 ODMSP.  Additionally, good 
recommended practices are embodied in the 2015 Recommendations for Optimal CubeSat Operations.  Both 
documents are included with this presentation.  The attached presentation slides highlight all ODMSP requirements, 
especially key new expected practices for large constellations, active debris removal, and un-trackable or minimally-
trackable swarms. 
This paper consists of two exhibits: the 2019 ODMSP and the 2015 JSpOC Recommendations. 
TABLE 1: 
U.S. Government 
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, November 2019 Update 
 
PREAMBLE 
The United States Government (USG) Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) 
were established in 2001 to address the increase in orbital debris in the near-Earth space 
environment. The goal of the ODMSP was to limit the generation of new, long-lived debris by 
the control of debris released during normal operations, minimizing debris generated by 
accidental explosions, the selection of safe flight profile and operational configuration to 
minimize accidental collisions, and postmission disposal of space structures. While the original 
ODMSP adequately protected the space environment at the time, the USG recognizes that it is in 
the interest of all nations to minimize new debris and mitigate effects of existing debris. This 
fact, along with increasing numbers of space missions, highlights the need to update the ODMSP 
and to establish standards that can inform development of international practices. This 2019 
update includes improvements to the original objectives as well as clarification and additional 
standard practices for certain classes of space operations. The improvements consist of a 
quantitative limit on debris released during normal operations, a probability limit on accidental 
explosions, probability limits on accidental collisions with large and small debris, and a 
reliability threshold for successful postmission disposal. The new standard practices established 
in the update include the preferred disposal options for immediate removal of structures from the 
near-Earth space environment, a low-risk geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) transfer disposal 
option, a long-term reentry option, and improved move-away-and-stay-away storage options in 
medium Earth orbit (MEO) and above GEO. The update also incorporates new sections to clarify 
and address operating practices for large constellations, rendezvous and proximity operations, 
small satellites, satellite servicing, and other classes of space operations. The updated standard 
practices are significant, meaningful, and achievable. The 2019 ODMSP, by establishing 
guidelines for USG activities, provides a reference to promote efficient and effective space safety 
practices for other domestic and international operators. The USG intends to update and refine 
the ODMSP as necessary in the future to address advances in both technology and policy. 
 
The USG will follow the ODMSP, consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness, 
in the procurement and operation of spacecraft, launch services, and the conduct of tests and 
experiments in space. When practical, operators should consider the benefits of going beyond the 
standard practices and take additional steps to limit the generation of orbital debris. Together 
with continued development of standards and best practices for space traffic management, the 
updated ODMSP will contribute to safe space operations and the long-term sustainability of 
space activities. 
OBJECTIVE 
1. CONTROL OF DEBRIS RELEASED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Programs and projects will assess and limit the amount of debris released in a planned manner 
during normal operations. Objects with planned functions after release should follow standard 
practices set forth in Objectives 2 through 5. 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
1-1. In all operational orbit regimes: Spacecraft and upper stages should be designed to 
eliminate or minimize debris released during normal operations. Each instance of planned 
release of debris larger than 5 mm in any dimension that remains on orbit for more than 25 years 
should be evaluated and justified. For all planned released debris larger than 5 mm in any 
dimension, the total debris object-time product in low Earth orbit (LEO) should be less than 100 
object-years per upper stage or per spacecraft. The total object-time product in LEO is the sum, 
over all planned released objects, of the orbit dwell time in LEO. 
 
 
 
OBJECTIVE 
2. MINIMIZING DEBRIS GENERATED BY ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Programs and projects will assess and limit the probability of accidental explosion during and 
after completion of mission operations. 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
2-1. Limiting the risk to other space systems from accidental explosions and associated orbital 
debris during mission operations: In developing the design of a spacecraft or upper stage, each 
program should demonstrate, via commonly accepted engineering and probability assessment 
methods, that the integrated probability of debris-generating explosions for all credible failure 
modes of each spacecraft and upper stage (excluding small particle impacts) is less than 0.001 (1 
in 1,000) during deployment and mission operations. 
 
2-2. Limiting the risk to other space systems from accidental explosions and associated orbital 
debris after completion of mission operations: All on-board sources of stored energy of a 
spacecraft or upper stage should be depleted or safed when they are no longer required for 
mission operations or postmission disposal. Depletion should occur as soon as such an operation 
does not pose an unacceptable risk to the payload. Propellant depletion burns and compressed 
gas releases should be designed to minimize the probability of subsequent accidental collision 
and to minimize the impact of a subsequent accidental explosion. 
OBJECTIVE 
3. SELECTION OF SAFE FLIGHT PROFILE AND OPERATIONAL 
CONFIGURATION 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Programs and projects will assess and limit the probability of operating space systems becoming 
a source of debris by collisions with human-made objects or meteoroids. 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
3-1. Collision with large objects during orbital lifetime: In developing the design and mission 
profile for a spacecraft or upper stage, a program will estimate and limit the probability of 
collision with objects 10 cm and larger during orbital lifetime to less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000). For 
the purpose of this assessment, 100 years is used as the maximum orbital lifetime. 
 
3-2. Collision with small debris during mission operations: Spacecraft design will consider and 
limit the probability to less than 0.01 (1 in 100) that collisions with micrometeoroids and orbital 
debris smaller than 1 cm will cause damage that prevents planned postmission disposal. 
 
 
 
OBJECTIVE 
4. POSTMISSION DISPOSAL OF SPACE STRUCTURES 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Programs and projects will plan for disposal procedures for a structure (i.e., launch vehicle 
components, upper stages, spacecraft, and other payloads) at the end of mission life to minimize 
impact on future space operations. 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
4-1. Disposal for final mission orbits: A spacecraft or upper stage may be disposed of by one of 
the following methods: 
 
a. Direct reentry or heliocentric, Earth-escape: Maneuver to remove the structure from Earth 
orbit at the end of mission into (1) a reentry trajectory or (2) a heliocentric, Earth-escape 
orbit. These are the preferred disposal options. For direct reentry, the risk of human 
casualty from surviving components with impact kinetic energies greater than 15 joules 
should be less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000). Design-for-demise and other measures, including 
reusability and targeted reentry away from landmasses, to further reduce reentry human 
casualty risk should be considered. 
 
b. Atmospheric reentry: Leave the structure in an orbit in which, using conservative 
projections for solar activity, atmospheric drag will limit the lifetime to as short as 
practicable but no more than 25 years after completion of mission. If drag enhancement 
devices are to be used to reduce the orbit lifetime, it should be demonstrated that such 
devices will significantly reduce the area-time product of the system or will not cause 
spacecraft or large debris to fragment if a collision occurs while the system is decaying 
from orbit. The risk of human casualty from surviving components with impact kinetic 
energies greater than 15 joules should be less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000). 
 
c. Storage between LEO and GEO: 
I. Maneuver to an eccentric disposal orbit (e.g., GEO transfer) where (1) perigee 
altitude remains above the LEO zone for at least 100 years, (2) apogee altitude 
remains below the GEO zone for at least 100 years, and (3) the time spent by the 
structure between 20,182 +/- 300 km is limited to 25 years or less over 200 years; or, 
 
II. Maneuver to a near-circular disposal orbit to (1) avoid crossing 20,182 +/- 300 km, 
the GEO zone, and the LEO zone for at least 100 years, and (2) limit the risk to other 
operational constellations, for example, by avoiding crossing the altitudes occupied 
by known missions of 10 or more spacecraft using near-circular orbits, for 100 years. 
 
d. Storage above GEO: Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude sufficiently above 35,986 
km (upper boundary of the GEO zone) to ensure the structure remains outside the GEO 
zone for at least 100 years. 
 
e. Long-term reentry for structures in MEO, Tundra orbits, highly inclined GEO, and other 
orbits: Maneuver to a disposal orbit where orbital resonances will increase the eccentricity 
for long-term reentry of the structure. In developing this disposal plan, the program should 
(1) limit the postmission orbital lifetime to as short as practicable but no more than 200 
years, (2) limit the time spent by the structure in the LEO zone, the GEO zone, and 
between 20,182 +/- 300 km to 25 years or less per zone; and (3) limit the probability of 
collisions with debris 10 cm and larger to less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000) during orbital 
lifetime. To limit human casualty risk from the reentry of the structure, surviving 
components with impact kinetic energies greater than 15 joules should have less than 7 m2 
total debris casualty area or less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000) human casualty risk. 
 
f. Direct retrieval: Retrieve the structure and remove it from orbit preferably at completion 
of mission, but no more than 5 years after completion of mission. 
 
4-2. Reliability of disposal: The probability of successful postmission disposal should be no less 
than 0.9 with a goal of 0.99 or better. 
 
The geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) zone is defined as the region between the altitudes of 
35,586 and 35,986 km. The low Earth orbit (LEO) zone is defined as the region below 2000 km 
altitude. The medium Earth orbit (MEO) is the region between LEO and GEO. 
Because of fuel gauging uncertainties near the end of mission, a program should use a maneuver 
strategy that reduces the risk of leaving the structure near an operational orbit regime. 
OBJECTIVE 
5. CLARIFICATION AND ADDITIONAL STANDARD PRACTICES FOR CERTAIN 
CLASSES OF SPACE OPERATIONS 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
These classes of space operations and structures should follow Objectives 1 through 4 plus the 
additional standard practices for orbital debris mitigation set forth in this section. 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
5-1. Large Constellations: A constellation consisting of 100 or more operational spacecraft 
cumulative is considered a large constellation. 
 
a. Each spacecraft in a large constellation should have a probability of successful postmission 
disposal at a level greater than 0.9 with a goal of 0.99 or better. In determining the 
successful postmission disposal threshold, factors such as mass, collision probability, 
orbital location, and other relevant parameters should be considered. 
 
b. For large constellations, Objective 4-1.a. is the preferred postmission disposal option for 
the spacecraft. In developing the mission profile, the program should limit the cumulative 
reentry human casualty risk from the constellation. 
 
5-2. Small satellites, including CubeSats, should follow the standard practices set forth in 
Objectives 1 through 4. For spacecraft smaller than 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm when fully 
deployed: 
 
a. Any spacecraft in LEO should be limited to an orbital lifetime as short as practicable but 
no more than 25 years after completion of mission. 
 
b. The total spacecraft object-time product in LEO should be less than 100 object-years per 
mission. 
 
5-3. Rendezvous, proximity operations, and satellite servicing: In developing the mission profile 
for a structure, the program should limit the risk of debris generation as an outcome of the 
operations. The program should (1) limit the probability of accidental collision, and (2) limit the 
probability of accidental explosion resulting from the operations. Any planned debris generated 
as a result of the operations should follow the standard practices for mission-related debris set 
forth in Objective 1. 
 
TABLE 2: 
JSpOC Recommendations for 
Optimal CubeSat Operations   
1 JFCC SPACE AND THE JSPOC   
The  Joint  Functional  Component  Command  for  SPACE  (JFCC  SPACE)  is  responsible  for  identifying,  
cataloging  and  tracking  over  23,000  man‐‐‐made  objects  achieving  orbit.  JFCC  SPACE  executes  this  
mission  using  data  collected  by  the  U.S.  Space  Surveillance  Network  (SSN)  and  through  the  
expertise  of  its  personnel  at  the  Joint  Space  Operations  Center  (JSpOC),  located  at  Vandenberg  
Air  Force  Base,  in  California.  The  proliferation  of  CubeSats  (10cm  x  10cm  x  10cm  satellites)  and  
associated  technology,  have  posed  unique  tracking  and  identification  challenges.  In  light  of  this  
evolving  situation,  JFCC  SPACE  would  like  to  share  information  on  the  current  challenges  it  faces  
and  propose  recommendations  on  how  to  optimize  operations  in  coordination  with  the  JSpOC,  to  
support  the  growing  government,  commercial,  and  academic  CubeSat  communities  of  interest.   
 
2 CURRENT CHALLENGES   
In  late  2013,  two  launches  presented  an  unprecedented  challenge  for  JSpOC  personnel.  The  ORS‐
3  mission  launched  STPSAT  3  and  27  CubeSats,  closely  followed  by  a  DNEPR  rocket  hosting  31  
CubeSats.  Both  launches  involved  multiple  owner/operators  (O/Os)  from  all  facets  of  the  space  
community;  U.S.  and  foreign  governments,  academia,  and  commercial  entities,  all  of  whom  
depend  on  the  JSpOC  to  a  varying  degree  for  support  functions  to  ensure  mission  success.  These  
two  independent  multi‐‐‐payload  deployment  missions  presented  known  challenges  to  JSpOC  
processes.  After‐‐‐action  reviews  completed  after  the  launches  revealed  that  the  JSpOC  and  O/Os  
require  higher  levels  of  collaboration  in  order  to  provide  optimal  pre‐‐‐  and  post‐‐‐launch  
support.  Notable  points  included:  
 The  JSpOC  uses  information  provided  by  the  launch  entity  and/or  O/O  as  the  truth‐‐
‐source.  Without  launch  information  from  the  launch  entity  and/or  O/O,  the  JSpOC  has  
limited  data  to  inform  tracking  and  cataloging,  which  delays  delivery  of  information  to  
satellite  stakeholders.  
 The  JSpOC  does  not  command  and  control  satellites,  communicate  with  satellites  (passive  
or  active),  or  provide  telemetry  of  satellites.  Many  O/Os  are  unaware  of  this  fact.  The  
JSpOC  relies  on  O/Os  to  perform  this  role  and  provide  telemetry  information  that  may  
assist  with  identification.  
 The  JSpOC  depends  on  O/Os  to  provide  detailed  information  on  launch  plans  and  
payload  deployment  to  ensure  individual  payload(s)  are  quickly  identified  upon  separation  
or  release  from  the  payload  deployer.  Without  this  information  and  coordination,  the  
JSpOC  may  have  difficulty  tracking  and  differentiating  CubeSats.  As  a  result,  the  JSpOC  
may  be  required  to  categorize  the  objects  as  unknown  “analyst  satellites”  until  more  
data  can  be  collected.  Analyst  satellites  are  not  publicly  releasable,  which  makes  it  
difficult  for  O/Os  to  conduct  their  missions,  and  inhibits  collaborative  identification  efforts  
between  the  JSpOC  and  the  O/O.    
 The  JSpOC  physically  tracks  objects  and  provides  assessment  screenings  using  SSN  
observations  and  O/O‐‐‐provided  information,  both  before  and  after  launch.  These  
services  include  Launch  Conjunction  Assessment,  Early  Orbit  Conjunction  Assessment,  and  
On‐‐‐Orbit  Conjunction  Assessment.  The  JSpOC  is  dedicated  to  supporting  spaceflight  
safety  through  all  mission  phases,  but  relies  on  O/O‐‐‐provided  information  to  do  so  
consistently.   
 
3 RECOMMENDATIONS   
After  extensive  coordination  with  CubeSat  O/Os,  the  JSpOC  understands  that  O/Os  have  a  wide  
range  of  requirements,  spanning  from  pre‐‐‐launch  mission  planning  to  spaceflight  safety  support.  
Accordingly,  the  JSpOC  offers  the  following  recommendations  for  CubeSat  launch  entities  and  
O/Os  to  consider  as  they  conduct  CubeSat  planning.   
CubeSat  Development:  
 Satellite  identification  is  extremely  difficult  to  determine  without  initiative  taken  by  the  
launch  entity  and/or  O/O.    
o Identification  markers,  either  physical  or  signal  based,  should  be  considered  and  
these  should  be  different  for  each  object  deployed  in  a  multi‐‐‐payload  launch.  
Markers  should  function  for  at  least  two  months  to  provide  sufficient  time  for  
object  separation  and  maximize  the  likelihood  of  identification.  
 Satellites  should  have  some  maneuver  capability  to  facilitate  conjunction  avoidance  on‐‐
‐orbit.  
 Satellites  should  be  built  to  allow  controlled  reentry  or  expedited  uncontrolled  reentry  to  
minimize  the  threat  of  individual  CubeSats  beyond  the  satellite’s  mission  life.   
 
Pre‐‐‐launch  Planning:  
 JFCC  SPACE  highly  encourages  early  engagement  between  the  launch  entity  and/or  
CubeSat  O/O(s)  and  the  JSpOC.  Early  engagement  includes  exchanging  mission  briefs,  
discussing  mission  support  requirements,  and  establishing  formalized  communication  
channels  prior  to  launch.  This  will  allow  the  JSpOC  to  provide  an  honest  assessment  of  
how  they  can  support  the  O/O’s  mission,  and  provide  recommendations  on  how  to  best  
achieve  mission  success.  
 Orbit  and  mission  parameters  should  be  tightly  scrutinized  and  controlled  by  O/Os.    
o With  some  margin,  operational  life  should  be  proportional  to  orbit  life.  For  
example,  a  satellite’s  operational  life  should  be  greater  than  2/3  of  the  orbital  
life.    
o Satellites  that  have  a  projected  orbit  100km  or  less  in  the  radial  component  from  
the  ISS  should  be  reevaluated  to  identify  alternatives  that  don’t  threaten  the  ISS  
or  to  determine  if  overall  mission  objectives  and  parameters  outweigh  the  risk  to  
Human  Space  Flight  (HSF)  objects.  In  general,  O/Os  should  deploy  CubeSats  below  
or  from  the  ISS.    
o Satellites  should  be  placed  into  high  inclination  orbits.  Early  engagement  will  allow  
the  JSpOC  to  review  the  launch  plan,  and  provide  recommendations  that  will  
ensure  maximum  sensor  coverage  to  optimize  tracking  and  identification,  as  well  
as  spaceflight  safety.     

 To  expedite  cataloging  and  identification,  the  launch  entity  and/or  O/O  should  provide  
the  following  to  the  JSpOC  (preferably  through  the  R‐‐‐15  Form,  10‐‐‐30  days  prior  to  
launch):    
o Orbital  regime  of  the  satellite(s)    
o Deployment  sequence  of  launch  vehicle  and  all  payloads  
 Satellites  should  be  deployed  at  multi‐‐‐second  intervals  during  burns  to  
facilitate  CubeSat  separation  and  JSpOC  detection/identification/tracking.  
Detailed  development  of  supporting  deployment  scenarios  such  as  
minimum  propulsion  thrust  (km/s)  recommendations  and  timed  satellite  
deployments  will  enable  observations.  This  will  lead  to  greater  probability  
of  individual  CubeSat  identification. 
 If  deployment  during  boost  is  not  an  option  then  deployments  during  
non‐‐‐  powered  flight  should  be  no  closer  than  60  seconds  apart.   
o Satellite  characteristics,  including  size,  maneuverability,  and  deployment  plans  (i.e.  
solar  panels,  parachutes,  shedding,  etc.)  
 To  ensure  spaceflight  safety,  the  launch  entity  or  satellite  O/O(s)  should  request  launch  
conjunction  assessment.     
o The  launch  entity  should  submit  the  launch  trajectories  and  analysis  requirements  
through  the  Form  22.     
o The  JSpOC  will  screen  the  trajectories  against  the  space  catalog  and  inform  the  
launch  entity  and/or  O/O  of  any  possible  conjunctions.   
Launch  
 Immediately  after  launch,  the  JSpOC  will  use  the  information  provided  by  the  launch  
entity  and/or  O/O  to  confirm  a  nominal  launch,  and  catalog  and  identify  the  launched  
satellites.  
 If  the  JSpOC  is  able  to  catalog  and  identify  a  satellite  according  to  provided  information,  
they  will  provide  the  initial  element  set  to  the  O/O.  
 If  cataloging  and  identification  is  complicated  due  to  lack  of  information  or  a  complex  
launch  sequence,  the  JSpOC  may  be  forced  to  catalog  the  objects  as  analyst  satellites.    
o If  the  O/O  pre‐‐‐coordinated  with  the  JSpOC,  the  JSpOC  will  provide  information  
on  analyst  satellites  and  ask  the  O/O  for  assistance  in  identifying  their  asset.    
o It  the  O/O  has  not  pre‐‐‐coordinated,  the  JSpOC  will  maintain  the  object  as  an  
analyst  satellite  until  sufficient  tracking  data  is  collected  to  confidently  catalog  the  
object.  
 
Post‐‐‐Launch  
 For  multi‐‐‐payload  launches,  satellites  that  are  CubeSats  or  smaller,  or  complex  
deployment  sequences,  ongoing  communication  with  the  JSpOC  is  critical  to  identifying  
satellites  and  providing  timely  and  accurate  conjunction  assessment.    
o If  available,  O/O  tracking  or  position  data  should  be  provided  to  the  JSpOC  to  
assist  in  identification.    
o If  the  O/O  cannot  provide  tracking  data,  the  JSpOC  will  provide  potential  
positional  data  and  ask  the  O/O  to  confirm  successful  communication.  
 During  the  early  orbit  phase  of  operations,  the  JSpOC  relies  on  O/O  information  and  
predicted  ephemeris  to  provide  accurate  conjunction  assessment  for  maneuverable  
missions.      
o The  O/O  can  provide  ephemeris  pre‐‐‐  and  post‐‐‐launch  for  early  orbit  
conjunction  assessment  to  assist  in  maneuver  planning.  
 If  the  CubeSat  mission  is  non‐‐‐maneuverable,  the  JSpOC  will  rely  on  SSN  data  to  provide  
conjunction  assessment.  In  this  case,  information  from  the  launch  provider  and/or  O/O  is  
absolutely  critical  to  cataloging  the  object  as  soon  as  possible  so  that  the  JSpOC  can  
provide  conjunction  assessment  based  on  high‐‐‐accuracy  catalog  data.  
 
 4 GETTING STARTED   
The  JSpOC  would  like  to  engage  as  early  as  possible  with  all  CubeSat  launch  entities  and  O/Os  
to  discuss  mission  requirements,  negotiate  optimal  support,  and  establish  lasting  relationships  
that  will  ensure  mutual  operational  success.  
 Visit  JFCC  SPACE’s  public  website,  Space‐Track.org,  for  a  description  of  SSA  Services     
o Available  at  no  cost  to  all  satellite  O/Os     
o https://www.space‐‐‐track.org/documentation#odr     
o Includes  links  to  all  launch  planning  and  support  forms  (R‐‐‐15,  Form  22,  Orbital  
Data  Request)   
 Consider  an  SSA  Sharing  Agreement  with  USSTRATCOM    
o Protects  proprietary  information    
o Entitles  signatory  to  advanced  SSA  services    
o Contact  j513@stratcom.mil  for  more  information  
 Contact  the  JSpOC’s  SSA  Sharing  Cell  to  discuss  your  mission  and  coordinate  immediate  
support     
o Email:  jspoc.ssasharing@us.af.mil     
o Phone:  805‐606‐2675   
 
